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B

ack in the dark ages (i.e., 1980s) when I was pursuing
my doctoral degree at the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill, I read Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) book on how
science evolves over time. That book had a big inﬂuence on
my thinking then, and it continues to inﬂuence me. Indeed,
that book seems especially pertinent to this particular issue
for reasons which I will explain later on in this essay.
For those who are not familiar with this particular book,
Kuhn (1962) maintained that nearly all sciences operated
within a prevailing or dominant paradigm. A scientiﬁc
paradigm was like a lens for analyzing problems for a community of scientiﬁc scholars. In essence, it is a set of assumptions about how things operate and these assumptions
inﬂuence the theories articulated and data collected. Within
this community of scholars, “normal” science was conducted and practical “puzzles” were addressed. As such,
normal science typically involved ﬁnding detailed answers
to already known ideas.
As scholars can only see what they are looking for and a
paradigm guides what you can see, all paradigms can serve
as blinders. However, paradigms do not get replaced until a
credible alternative paradigm arises, and it more effectively
describes and explains unsolved puzzles from the old paradigm. Interestingly, Kuhn observed that most paradigm
shifts, or scientiﬁc revolutions, were fomented by people
operating outside of the established paradigm. I was also
interested to note that Kuhn maintained that individuals
operating within different paradigms could not effectively
communicate with each other as they operated from totally
different sets of assumptions.
I think that Kuhn has some valuable insights for those
interested in comparative corporate governance research
and practice. The mission here at CGIR is to develop a global
theory of corporate governance that is parsimonious, accurate, and generalizable to any economy of the world. Most of
what we do in scholarly journals is publish “normal science”
where relatively small puzzles are explored and some new
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insights are generated within the prevailing paradigm. Here
at CGIR, we are no exception to this general insight.
However, one of the things that makes us different at
CGIR is that we are an interdisciplinary journal that publishes research from a wide variety of scholarly disciplines.
In addition, our reviewers and authors hail from all over the
world because the only way to get to a truly global perspective is to enlist the collective wisdom of the worldwide body
of scholars.
Nonetheless, there are many within our community of
scholars who are not satisﬁed with the rather plodding
progress toward a global theory of corporate governance.
Furthermore, there are some who are at the fringes of the
community who read our scholarship and actively question whether the prevailing paradigm that we are operating
under is the best one for moving toward a more truly
global theory that addresses critical corporate governance
issues.
With these concerns in mind, I would like to announce a
new type of article which we intend to publish in CGIR in
the future. We call these new articles “Perspectives” because
their aim is to challenge the existing paradigm in which
corporate governance research operates, point to anomalies
that are not being solved, and suggest an alternative worldview that may better solve the problems before us.
As such, I am pleased to announce that John Carver, a
prominent corporate governance consultant and member of
our editorial advisory board, offers his own perspective in
this issue on what is wrong with the prevailing paradigm
and what we need to do about it. In his thoughtful article
(which went through six iterations and was reviewed by ﬁve
different reviewers), Carver suggests that too many corporate governance studies examine what is, as opposed to what
should be. As such, he recommends more normative
research that builds out a series of principles from which all
corporate governance practices can be evaluated. I commend
his article for your reading and encourage others to submit
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their own “perspective” on what is wrong with our prevailing paradigm and what we could do about it in the future.
Of course, we also publish a series of “normal” science
articles in this issue as well. Speciﬁcally, our leadoff article
by Renders, Gaeremynck and Sercu studies the relationship
between corporate governance ratings and ﬁrm performance across 14 developed economies in Europe from 1999
to 2003. Using agency and institutional logics, they ﬁnd that:
(1) corporate governance ratings are positively associated
with ﬁrm performance, measured using market-based and
accounting-based measures; (2) this relationship is moderated by institutional context; and (3) corporate governance
ratings are improving over time.
A second article operating within the dominant paradigm
was authored by Chen, Liu, and Li. These scholars sought to
better understand the determinants of executive compensation within 502 Chinese ﬁrms during the period of 2001–
2006. They reﬁned and extended agency predictions by
ﬁnding that the extent of CEO shareholding, degree of
foreign investment, and the presence of a compensation
committee were all positively related to executive compensation, above and beyond the standard controls. Interestingly, traditional corporate governance monitoring
mechanisms were all found to be unrelated to executive
compensation in this governance environment.
Next, Hoi and Robin reexamine the relationship between
ownership and ﬁrm value in a matched paired sample of US
ﬁrms in 2000. Of course, it is relatively well established in the
literature that insider ownership is negatively related to ﬁrm
value in multiple governance environments, but previous
ﬁndings have not been very robust. This study reﬁnes and
extends our understanding of that relationship by exploring
a more nuanced measure of ownership by considering both
incentive for self-dealing (e.g., dual-class versus single-class
ownership structures) as well as proximity of control (e.g.,
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insider, outsider on the board, and outsider not on the
board). Notably, they report a relatively strong interaction
effect when both incentive and proximity are considered
(e.g., dual-class and high-proximity situations), all else being
equal. In sum, we learn that the market generally punishes
dual-class ﬁrms where the largest shareholder is either the
top executive or an outsider sitting on the board, but it does
not punish ﬁrms when this happens in single-class ﬁrms or
when dual-class ﬁrms’ largest shareholder is someone who
does not sit on the board.
Finally, Nielsen and Huse push the boundaries of the
extant paradigm by examining actual board processes
within 201 Norwegian ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, they explore how
gender diversity on corporate boards may inﬂuence three
board processes (i.e., development activities, board conﬂict,
and open debate) and on two dimensions of board effectiveness (i.e., strategic control and operating control). Notably,
they ﬁnd that the prevalence of female directors on the board
are largely positively related to both board processes and
effectiveness, with the exception of no relationship found
with degree of open debate. This study challenges the existing paradigm to study actual (not inferred) board processes
as well as consider nontraditional paradigms (such as
gender theory) to explain governance outcomes.
For those who are interested in incremental and revolutionary reﬂections on corporate governance theory and
research, I commend this issue to your reading. And for
those interested in how science progresses over time, I
commend Kuhn’s (1962) Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions
book as well.
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